Sir George Caswall vs. the Duke of Portland: Financial Contracts and Litigation in the wake of the South Sea Bubble by Gary S. Shea
CENTRE FOR DYNAMIC MACROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
WORKING PAPER SERIES 
 
 
* School of Economics and Finance, Castlecliffe, University of St Andrews, Fife KY16 9AL, 
Scotland, UK. Tel: +44 (0) 1334 462441. E-mail: gss2@st-andrews.ac.uk. Web: www.st-
andrews.ac.uk/economics/staff/pages/g.shea.shtml. 
 
CASTLECLIFFE, SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS & FINANCE, UNIVERSITY OF ST ANDREWS, KY16 9AL 






Sir George Caswall vs. the Duke of Portland: 
Financial Contracts and Litigation in the 





University of St Andrews 
 
 





“The Evolution of Financial Institutions from the Seventeenth 
to the Twenty-First Century” 
Papers in Honor of Professor Larry Neal upon his retirement from the University of 




REVISED AUGUST 2007 
 In one of the more influential papers in economic history of the past twenty years, North and 
Weingast (1989) described the connections between a singular event, the English Glorious 
Revolution of 1688, and the subsequent evolution of political institutions and capital markets 
in Great Britain. Although it is usually difficult to argue that a particular series of events 
represents a true watershed in history, the arguments presented in their paper are quite 
persuasive in regards to public finance. In terms of both scale and unit cost of public finance, 
there is little similarity between the reigns of the Stuart and of the early Hanoverian 
monarchs. From about 1688 it is clear that a train events was put in motion that would 
transform the relation between government and finance. North and Weingast persuasively 
argued that these events were: 1) royal political revolution, followed by 2) the complete 
seizure of taxation powers by Parliament and by 3) an extension of Parliamentary oversight 
of expenditure – all of which were made necessary by the financial exigencies of prolonged 
large-scale European warfare. These processes were coupled with the rise of a market for 
tradable government debt, which was in turn accompanied by the development of a smaller 
market for joint-stock company equity securities. All of these developments are part of the 
collection of events that is now called the Financial Revolution in England. 
This watershed in history can be demarked by a number of events. The Treaty of 
Utrecht (1712/13) marks the end of large-scale European warfare and the beginning of an 
extended period of comparative peace until there was world war again later in the 18
th 
century. Although the Northern War was to trundle on to 1720, the core impetus for the 
European conflagration of the previous 50 years, French expansionism, was ended with the 
Utrecht treaty. The Hanoverian Succession (1715) too is useful as a marker because it was 
part of a new political settlement between the Crown, Parliament and the English people. The 
political settlement had several important aspects: the permanent establishment of frequent 
Parliaments; the stabilisation of ministerial control of Parliamentary business; the 
establishment of a stable role for religion in public life and a clear demarcation of the   2
Crown’s role in foreign affairs. But it is the South Sea Bubble of 1720 that particularly 
interests us as the demarcation of the historical divide described by North and Weingast. In 
Section VI of their paper, they argued that growth and security of private capital markets 
paralleled similar growths in the markets for public finance. During the South Sea Bubble 
and afterwards, however, it was by no means clear that such a parallel development would 
take place. It did not appear in 1720 that English law was in any way prepared, or was being 
prepared, to accommodate many of the innovations of the Financial Revolution. 
The Bubble Act (June 1720) imposed upon incorporated business enterprise certain 
limitations which were intended to discourage joint-stock capital structures for companies. 
New company organisation was thereafter to be encouraged along the lines of partnerships or 
trusts. The relation between the law and business was left to be worked out in practice and in 
case-law, but rarely spelled out in the clear terms of legislated law. This argument is one 
qualification to the North and Weingast thesis that is already well-documented.
1 In this paper 
we shall attempt to establish another qualification by examining how prepared and how 
friendly the legal system was towards the development of secondary markets for securities – 
the very markets in which private property rights to financial assets were exchanged. 
There has been no extensive description of the legal environment or aftermath of the 
South Sea Bubble. Dickson describes how the litigation between the public and the South 
Sea Company was largely prevented,
2 but a history of private litigation between individuals 
has not been told except in Banner’s description of some of the arguments and judgements 
that appeared in printed law reports.
3 What can such a history usefully reveal? It can reveal 
what was the custom in financial contracting and yield insights into the costs and efficiency 
of financial dealing and markets. The efficiency of financial markets and their completeness 
will probably be at the heart of any future theory of the South Sea Bubble. Scholars are far 
                                                 
1  See Harris, Industrializing English law. 
2 cf. fn. 5, section II. 
3 cf. fn. 8, section II.   3
from a formal theory of this great stock market crash, but whenever such a theory is achieved, 
it will probably depend upon much better information than we currently have about the costs 
and efficiency of financial contracting in 1720. A second reason for doing such a history is 
that the cases studied will be revelatory of peoples’ hopes and expectations during the South 
Sea Bubble. This not only fleshes out the social history of the Bubble, but may reveal clues 
as to what people thought the fundamental value of the South Sea Scheme was. A final 
reason for commencing a legal study of the Bubble’s aftermath is so that it can become a part 
of the legal history of contract and liability. London was arguably the birthplace of modern 
financial markets and financial contracts and it would be surprising if the special demands of 
financial contracting as practiced in London did not leave some special mark on the 
development of contract law. The plan for this paper is to use the story of the first Duke of 
Portland as a means of entry into the study of the legal history of the South Sea Bubble and 
private financial contracts. 
The next section is an outline of some important features of the South Sea Scheme 
and the resulting Bubble. Section II describes the scope of possible legal conflict concerning 
financial contracts stemming from the events of 1720. Much of this section is a review of 
what little literature we have on such legal conflicts. In section III I describe the 
circumstances of trade in South Sea Company liabilities in 1720 and how they defined the 
special features of the legal conflicts that were to follow. Section IV is a short introduction to 
the Duke of Portland himself and sources that are useful for the study of his role in the South 
Sea Bubble. In section V I look at Portland’s actions in the markets for securities and show 
how he came to his financial and legal difficulties. Section VI describes the Duke’s legal 
struggle to escape financial ruin. Section VII contains my conclusions and suggestions for 
further research.   4
 
I.  The South Sea Scheme and the South Sea Bubble 
 
What was the South Sea Bubble? More properly, in posing such a question we should 
employ the term used by people in 1720 and first ask, ‘what was the South Sea Scheme?’ A 
commonly-held modern misconception of the South Sea Scheme is that it was primarily a 
stock flotation, as would occur with the projection of a new railway company in the 19
th 
century or the public offering of stock in an internet company in the late 20
th century. There 
was certainly flotation of new stock in 1720, but it occurred in a stock market very unlike 
anything we know of today. The most important thing to know about the stock markets of 
1720 is that the overwhelming numbers and values of stocks traded and issued in them were 
stocks in the three so-called ‘great moneyed companies’. Since the foundation of the Bank of 
England in 1694, the re-organisation of the East India Company in 1710 and the foundation 
of the South Sea Company in 1712, these three institutions tried to expand their respective 
businesses and competed with each other for more complete control of the supply of the most 
important component of the asset-side of their balance sheets – the interest-paying debt 
obligations of the government itself. Although the trading interests of each of these three 
institutions were quite different, the very existence of each institution depended upon the 
simultaneous privilege and obligation of lending to the national government. 
It was thus for their own survival and to strengthen their legal foundations that the 
three companies occasionally competed with each other for the political favours of the 
government. The South Sea Scheme was one such competition in which the South Sea 
Company sought for itself the complete management of the government’s debt. This was by 
far the grandest of all such competitions. Indeed, it was thought to be so grand and dangerous 
that, by the end of 1720, the political nation decided that there would never be another such 
competition. In the post-Bubble legislative settlements of 1721 the relations between the   5
three great moneyed companies were given stability and the shape they would retain well 
into the 19
th century.
4 It was the connection in peoples’ minds between the large-scale 
revolution in public finances implied by the South Sea Scheme and the future of private 
property rights that resonates so well with the themes discussed by North and Weingast. To 
many people in 1720, however, the South Sea Scheme appeared more as a threat to private 
property rights rather than as a harbinger of better property rights in capital markets. 
Before the legislative settlements of 1721 were put in place, however, there was the 
famous Bubble speculation about the shape and ultimate success of the South Sea Scheme. 
The real core of the speculation was about the future structure of national public finances. 
The times then were so different and the Scheme, even in its own context, was so grandiose 
that it is impossible to offer analogies that would make the concerns of people in 1720 
understandable to modern readers. The arguments in the great majority of the polemical 
literature and the emphasis in debates in Parliament and in private correspondence 
concerning the South Sea Scheme were not so much about possible earnings, profits and 
payouts; the arguments were mostly about private property rights, legal rights, control of 
public finance, control of Parliament and the very control of government itself. 
 
II.  The Legal Conflict to Come 
 
The extent and direction of liability in financial contracts was at the heart of many of the 
debates stemming from the South Sea Scheme in 1720. There has been little literature on this 
debate, especially in terms of how it actually played out in the courts. A good way to 
organise our discussion is to first consider two basic strands in the controversy: i) there was 
one debate on the liability that came from the South Sea Company’s relations with the public 
                                                 
4 This summary of the more long-term effects of the South Sea Bubble are those discussed in more detail by 
Dickson (1967, Chapter 8).   6
and ii) there was another debate on liabilities between private persons that were generated in 
the course of the South Sea Bubble. 
The debate on the liabilities generated between the public and Company can itself be 
broken into two parts: i) there was the more important issue surrounding the Company’s 
proper relationship with the holders of government annuities and ii) the less important 
questions about the Company’s proper relationships with the public subscribers for shares in 
cash. The former is given prominence in the histories of the Bubble and concerns the terms 
by which those government annuitants were to obtain South Sea securities in return for the 
annuities they held in 1720. When the resulting terms were shown to be unfavourable to the 
annuitants, public interest was turned towards the proper restitution (if any) that should be 
undertaken. The resulting political struggle threatened the very foundations of public finance 
in Britain that had been successfully laid more than two decades previously. That threat was 
finally brought to an end by the legislative manoeuvrings of Robert Walpole.
5
Less extensively discussed is the debate about the Company’s relationships with its 
cash subscribers. This was arguably not as important a debate as the one concerning the 
annuitants. Only a small portion of the South Sea Company’s equity liabilities was affected 
by the cash subscriptions for shares in 1720; in the South Sea Scheme the liability side of the 
Company’s balance sheet was being restructured primarily by the issue of large amounts of 
new debt (to be held by the Treasury, for the most part) and large amounts of new equity that 
were going to be issued directly to owners of government annuities. Nevertheless, until the 
Company’s new relations with the government and the annuitants were put on a final footing, 
the cash subscriptions for shares in 1720 were the primary means by which the Company 
raised cash for its operations.
6 Many persons saw the cash subscriptions as the means by 
                                                 
5 Dickson, The Financial Revolution in England, chapters 7 and 8, Financial Relief and Reconstruction. 
6 The Company also managed to raise short-term cash (£1 million) by borrowing Exchequer Bills from the 
Treasury.   7
which the Company financed its most nefarious behaviour in 1720. The legal and political 
standing of the cash subscriptions is analysed in another paper.
7
The only study relevant to private financial contracting during and after the South Sea 
Bubble is Banner’s survey of treatises, judgements and reports on cases.
8 Of direct concern to 
this study are his conclusions with regard to absolute liability in contract. In section III of 
Chapter 2 he starts with a brief analysis of Sir David Dalrymple’s treatise
9 on time bargains 
and then reviews the implications for the judgements handed down in Thomson vs. 
Harcourt.
10
There were several South Sea pamphlets of the 1720’s that were evidently written by 
lawyers. The most extensive and interesting document of this type was Dalrymple’s Time 
Bargains. It is an important document because it is argued closely and is careful in its 
definition of terms. Dalrymple also did not fear to reveal his authorship (which was unusual) 
and, as a prominent legal officer serving in the government until shortly before the South Sea 
Bubble,
11 his opinion might be accorded some special authority. Dalrymple was indeed 
impressed with his own authority, wrote contemptuously of what he called coffee-house talk, 
and his writing was dedicated ironically to ‘my Brethren Animals, the Impudent and 
Ignorant’. His overriding concern was to address the large question of ‘what will become of 
Time Bargains? Will they be good or not?’
12 He declined to discuss the Common Law’s view 
on the matter because, as he admitted, it was too great a subject for his small volume. He 
took his arguments from Equity and the Civil Law, on which he could write with more 
authority as a one-time Scottish law officer. One of his first points was that on the one 
question of time bargains alone, Parliament must come in with an Act or Acts to regulate or 
put an end to disputes, 
                                                 
7 Shea, ‘Financial market analysis can go mad’, in particular, appendix II. 
8 Banner, Anglo-American security regulation, chapter 2, section III and chapter 3, section III. 
9 Dalrymple, Time Bargains. 
10 Thomson vs Harcourt, 1 Brown 193, 1 English Reports.  See also Cases of the appellant and respondent in 
the House of Lords (HL/PO/JU/4/3/4, HLRO).   8
I think this one Question affords such a fund for Law Pleas, that is Consequence 
enough to deserve the Parliament’s Notice ( ... ) The Parliament ought to give their 
Determination in all Cases, which they take Notice of, according to the Laws of Nature 
and Nations, and the universal Rules of Equity;
13
 
He wrote that in Equity and Civil Law a contract must be quid pro quo. Since no one 
expects to be a loser going into a contract, if they are a loser coming out by being wronged, 
‘then the Law ought to assist him’.
14 The Civil Law is hostile to bargains that result in sales 
at less or more than a good is worth, but the Common Law is more laissez-faire in this regard, 
everyone to be left to make the best bargains they can, be what they may.
15 As far as time 
bargains were concerned, Dalrymple distinguished between three types: a) Bargains on Stock; 
b) Bargains on first and second subscriptions and c) Bargains on third and fourth 
subscriptions. 
Bargains on Stock were of three types: i) transfers of stock; ii) the assignment of 
subscription receipts or iii) the taking of security (bills, bonds or other) for the price ‘between 
the Buyer and Seller, the Stock &c. still remaining in the Name and Possession of the Seller.’ 
The form of the bargains was of two sorts: a) ‘( … ) the Stock, &c. was sold a great deal 
above the Market Price at the Time, and a Bill or Bond taken for the Money payable at some 
time after’ or b) ‘Others were sold at the Market Price, and a Bond or Bill taken for the Price 
with Common Interest from the Date. This last sort hardly deserves the Name of Time 
Bargains. However, we shall now consider them as such, and discuss them first, because 
whatever Argument is good in Law against them, will be good against every one of the 
rest’.
16
                                                                                                                                                       
11 Sorenson, ‘Dalrymple’. 
12 Dalrymple, Time bargains, p.4. 
13 Ibid. Parliamentary intervention in such matters was delayed by a resolution of 19 December in the Commons. 
(Boyer, The political state of Great Britain, Vol. 20, pp. 584-5). Dalrymple discussed these matters at further 
length in Time bargains, pp. 41-2. The need for a general ‘annulling Act’ was a theme in many other tracts 
written in the period and, of course, soon such Acts became a reality with 7 Geo. 1, c. 5 and 7 Geo. 1, stat. 2. 
More details are found in the analyis of appendix II in Shea, “Financial market analysis can go mad”. 
14 Dalrymple, Time bargains, pp. 5-6. 
15 Ibid, pp. 6-8. 
16 Ibid, pp. 10-11.   9
If the Directors were in no way culpable and if the Stock was bought of a man in no 
way concerned in the mismanagement of the Company, then if a man was mistaken in the 
real Value of the Thing bought ( … ) (h)is promise therefore being founded in 
Presumptione facti quod non ita se habet, is in itself void, and by the Civil Law, the 
buyer is certainly Free, because the Læsio or Loss he sustains by the Bargain, is ultra 
dimidium valoris rei venditæ: And likewise because there was a latent Defect in the 
Thing Sold, which if the Buyer had known, he would never had promised so much for 
it: 
 
and he has grounds for an action against  the seller even if the seller was ignorant of the 
defect.
17
Dalrymple was also sympathetic to the application of the statutes against usury against 
certain styles of time bargains (such as in Thomson’s and Harcourt’s contract). For example, 
he would have certainly argued that when forward buyers and sellers were mutually agreed 
that future values would be high, then if they contract to deliver stock forward at a high price 
relative to the present price, the forward seller is certainly practicing usury upon the buyer.
18 
As we shall see, Portland’s advisors were quite interested in the argument that the Duke was 
a hapless victim of usury. 
Banner cites the final judgments in Thomson vs. Harcourt and concludes that the rule of 
absolute liability that prevailed in courts of law was easily adapted to cases involving 
financial contracting during the South Sea Bubble and afterwards. This conclusion is 
reinforced in section III of chapter 3 in which he recites the case reports that show, “From the 
beginning, the courts were willing to enforce contracts to buy or sell securities to the same 
extent as contracts to buy and sell any other item”.
19 In the reports which he reviews he 
concludes that all involved cases in which sellers were trying to hold buyers to their 
agreements to buy securities at agreed higher pre-crash prices. None of these cases failed on 
grounds that the agreements were themselves executory agreements – requiring performance 
                                                 
17 Ibid., pp. 12-13. This is a basic theme, which is echoed in much other pamphlet literature such as (Anon.), 
Queries. 
18 Dalrymple, Time bargains, pages 31-2. 
19 Banner, Anglo-American security regulation, p.111.   10
in exchange of monies and securities in the future. In his opening summary of the section he 
even goes so far to write, “Judges tended to give as much latitude as possible to the securities 
market, by enforcing even the more speculative transactions and narrowly construing would-
be statutory limits on trading…”
20
However well rules of absolute liability were affirmed in cases like Thomson vs. 
Harcourt, there is still much we need to learn from the processes in which they were applied. 
In particular we need to know how long and costly legal processes were. On 18
 June 1720, 
Thomson agreed to deliver to Harcourt South Sea stock at a future unknown date (dependent 
upon when the South Sea Company was willing to transform government annuities into 
company stock) at the rate of £920 per share. This date was just a few days prior to the 
closing the Company’s ledgers for transferring stock in order to make up the midsummer 
dividend on the stock. The closing period was anticipated to be about two-months long. 
There are many instances in the historical record of persons agreeing to forward purchases 
and sales of stock for an array of dates after the transfer books were to be reopened at the end 
of August 1720 and the Thomson/Harcourt agreement was but a typical example. What was 
also typical of their agreement is the forward delivery premium that was built into it. On 18 
June the value of South Sea share for immediate delivery was about £750 per share. The 
forward premium in their contract was thus large; £920 is 22.67 p.c. higher than £750 and, 
considering that the forward contract could have been expected to be completed in about 
three month’s time, this would imply a forward premium of about 100 p.c. p.a. This is a large 
number, but it is not an atypically large number for the early summer of 1720.
21 There could 
be several reasons for such a premium. Perhaps everyone at that time, including Thomson 
and Harcourt, were mutually optimistic and in agreement on probable future values for South 
Sea shares. Or on the other hand, perhaps there were a significant number of forward sellers 
who worried about the substantial risk that future South Sea share values might turn out to be 
                                                 
20 Ibid.   11
low. In writing an array of forward contracts such persons might expect that the typical 
forward buyer would attempt to renege on his contracts. A premium to compensate forward 
sellers for this risk might have been typical in forward delivery contracts.  It is hard to 
imagine forward premia of this size being common in a legal environment in which the rule 
of absolute liability in executory agreements was readily, cheaply and certainly applied. After 
all, small forward premia are achieved in modern-day forward markets, not through 
enforcement in courts, but through marking-to-market settlement systems that are a feature of 
modern-day futures exchanges. Thomson’s route to justice and restitution was a long and 
(probably) an expensive one and his suit was only partially successful. 
Banner’s work here depends primarily on printed law reports. Law reports were written 
and collected to be used in arguments and were at times accepted in court as precedents. 
They would thus tend to highlight aspects of cases that would be most useful for those 
purposes. The case that was most likely to go unreported was one in which all the legal 
principles involved were already well established. Although Banner’s survey establishes that 
the eighteenth-century financial contract for future performance was considered to be just 
another form of executory agreement, it does not show whether it was as easy or cheap to 
enforce as any other executory agreement. In particular, it does not tell us if the balance of 
litigation that followed in the wake of the South Sea Bubble favoured reneging buyers or 
fairly protected the sellers. To answer these questions would require an extensive survey of 
the bills presented, cases heard and their resolutions. No matter how well financial 
contracting fitted into the existing principles of contract law, there may have been something 
about financial contracts during and after the South Sea Bubble that made them easy to void. 
If so, and more importantly, if it was widely understood to be so, surely this would have 
implications for how people drew up contracts and valued them.
22 To perform this research is 
                                                                                                                                                       
21 This was an example of one type of bargain on stock described by Dalrymple. cf. fn. 16. 
22 Further evidence is found section III and supplementary appendix III (re the South Sea Company’s third-
subscription shares) in Shea, “Financial market analysis can go mad”.   12
a large task, but we argue that one very good place to start would be to look at a sample of 
cases outside of those that found their way into the law reports. It would be especially useful 
if these cases have a history that is also supported by private legal documents. Unlike a law 
report on a case in judgement, if we could look at how lawyers prepared strategically, how 
they looked at the law and formed strategies to use in the defence of their clients’ interests, 
we might discover something more like the true dimensions to the problem of obtaining 
efficiency in financial markets. I will argue that the Portland cases are one such sample of 
cases. 
 
III. Private Financial Contracts in 1720 
 
It was typical in this period that ledgers become occasionally disabled from normal 
day-to-day work so that they could be used to bring up to date the company’s larger scale 
book-keeping. The primary instance of this would be when stock ledgers would be closed so 
that a company’s clerks could use them to calculate and allocate dividends. Or whenever 
there was going to be any general change in the definition of the Company’s nominal capital, 
such as in a rights issue or in an exchange of shares for government annuities, the lumbering 
pace of eighteenth-century bookkeeping would require the stoppage of recorded trades in a 
company’s liabilities. In the South Sea Company’s case there were two periods in 1720 in 
which the stock ledgers were closed: a) they were closed for an announced two-month period 
from 22 June through 22 August 1720 and b) they were closed on 31 August, to remain shut 
until 22 September, but were suddenly reopened on 12 September.
23 This latter closing of the 
transfer books was a product of the South Sea directors’ usual chaotic style of financial 
management. As soon as a fourth cash subscription for shares was announced, there was 
                                                 
23 A forward financial contract whose performance was tied to the re-opening date that ended this period was 
the object of dispute in Maber vs. Thornton. We find the Company decision to close the ledgers in BL, Add. MS   13
discussion in committees about how it would subsequently be managed and whether it might 
not be converted into a rights issue for original shareholders or whether yet another (fifth) 
issue of shares should be a rights issue. While these matters were discussed, the Directors 
determined it would be best if the transfer ledgers were shut. Whether on a regularly 
announced basis or not, private persons had to be prepared to occasionally make their own 
markets for trade in company liabilities as best they could. Private financial contracting was 
instrumental in this process. 
Private financial contracting was also used to make the markets in company liabilities 
more complete. There clearly was a demand for contingent claims (options) in company 
liabilities. A large part of this demand may have been met in the ready-made markets for 
subscription shares,
24 but there may have been much other demand that could only be met 
through private contracting. Call options on shares were the most common from the evidence 
that we have. Options would use very much the same contractual forms as were used in 
forward delivery agreements. That is, the contracts would be written as bilateral contracts, 
using very similar legal language to bind one party and the other to perform in the contract.
25
 
IV. The Duke of Portland: Background and Sources 
 
Henry Bentinck (1682-1726) was the son of William Bentinck, who was a great 
favourite of William III and who rose in the King’s service as a diplomat and soldier. He was 
given the revived title of Earl of Portland, a title that the son (Henry) assumed upon the 
father’s death in 1709. In 1716 Henry was created the first Duke of Portland. The fortune that 
had been accumulated by his father in England was greater than the estates in Holland to 
                                                                                                                                                       
25,499, Court minutes, 26 August 1720. In the same source the ledgers are ordered (11 September) to be re-
opened the next day. 
24 My thesis in “Understanding financial derivatives during the South Sea Bubble” is that the Company’s 
subscription shares were a form of compound call option on the firm’s own shares.   14
which Henry’s half brother, Willem succeeded.
26 The Duke supplemented this inherited 
fortune by marriage to Elizabeth Noel (d.1736), first daughter of the second Earl of 
Gainsborough. As will be shown later, it was by borrowing from his own estate trust that 
Bentinck was able to leverage much of his speculative activity during the South Sea Bubble. 
It was also in his role as trustee that he later tried to protect some portion of this fortune from 
his creditors. 
The Portland(London) manuscripts at the University of Nottingham (class PL) are a 
collection of legal, financial and estate records that came to Nottingham in 1947 after 
sustaining considerable war damage in the London law offices of  Bailey, Shaw and Smith, 
solicitors to the Dukes of Portland since the late 1830’s. This collection is the main 
repository of legal and financial records of the Portland estate that go back to the early 
eighteenth century. There is also that portion of the Portland Manuscripts taken from 
Welbeck Abbey, not residing with the rest of the Portland Manuscripts at the British Library, 
which reside at the University of Nottingham (class Pw). These too contain many papers that 
are complementary to the PL-class financial and legal papers. 
Although Bubble historians have long known that Portland suffered some great reverses 
in 1720, without the PL and Pw classes of papers, no real history of his troubles could be 
written. Many of the papers are highly disordered and so a time-line can be difficult to 
discern in Portland’s legal affairs. Many of the papers are also unavailable whilst they await 
conservation. The manuscript curators at the University of Nottingham, however, have gone 
to great lengths to bring forward the conservation schedule for some of the most important 
documents so that they can be consulted and in other ways provided information from other 
papers that simply cannot be handled by anyone but a professional conservator. It is only 
                                                                                                                                                       
25 Examples of option contracts from this period are not numerous, but what few exist are quite alike in their 
legal language. See BL, Add. Ms. 22,639, fff. 193,195 and 203, as examples.  
26 Dunthorne and Onnekink, ‘Bentinck, Hans Willem , first earl of Portland (1649–1709)’.   15
thanks to the efforts and co-operation of the Manuscripts Collection staff at the University of 
Nottingham that this paper is possible.     
 
V. The Duke of Portland: His Actions during the Bubble 
 
The Portland manuscript collection contains several distinct sources of information 
about the Duke’s speculative contracts: 
a) contracts and draft contracts - There are twenty-four such contracts and drafts in the 
PL class, but there are a number of others in the Pw class, amongst which are the 
contracts most ruinous to the Duke. Table 1 describes some of the rough details of PL-
class contracts. The reader should not at this point work too hard in making sense of the 
contractual terms. Some of the contracts’ special characteristics, such as side-
agreements and guarantees, will be explained later; 
b) small ledgers and notebooks recording contracts - Complementing the contract 
documents are several notebooks and ledgers in which payments associated with some 
of the contracts were recorded. Importantly, these notebooks also contain references to 
contract-related payments for which no manuscript contracts exist.  We have placed a 
transcript of one of the more useful of these (Pw B 164) in Appendix 1
27 and 
c) memoranda discussing the contracts and resulting transactions - The details of many 
other contracts and related transactions can also be had from references in letters and 
legal documents. The memoranda often contain quite detailed legal analyses. 
 
From these sources we can trace the rough outlines of the Duke’s speculative activities. 
The Duke was known to a wide circle of individuals who helped him in his financial 
stratagems. For reasons never stated, it appears that the Duke decided upon on a highly 
aggressive attempt to control as much South Sea stock as he could through leverage. We do 
                                                 
27 Three other such sources are also useful, Pw B 165 and PL F2/6/179 and PL F2/6/310.   16
not know what his holdings were near the beginning of 1720, but by the time that the South 
Sea Scheme was fully underway with the South Sea Company’s Act (6 Geo 1, c.4) coming 
into force by later April, the Duke was starting to move aggressively.
28
The first such action that we can identify was his borrowing of £83,575 from the 
Portland estate trust. Created in 1689, the trust was augmented by extensive grants to the 
Duke’s father and by the Duke’s marriage to Elizabeth Noel in 1704. The trustees were the 
Duke’s two lawyers Sir John Eyles and M. Joseph Eyles and the banker Comrade de Gols. 
The Duke used the money, supplemented with his own cash to buy 160 South Sea shares.
29 
According to a later (and perhaps deliberately misleading legal strategy document) the 160 
shares were to be under control of the estate trustees with instructions to collect payouts and 
to sell the shares if their value fell to £700 p.s. or below. How the trustees were to have 
control of the shares however is difficult to see for the shares were re-transferred to six other 
individuals exclusive of the trustees.
30 We see these individuals named again as contracting 
to sell back to the Duke these shares (with the 10 p.c. midsummer stock dividend) at about 
£705 p.s. for the opening of the transfer ledgers.
31 Portland’s own promise to re-purchase the 
shares for about £705 each was the only protection accorded to the trust’s outlay of £83,575. 
In a hypothetical case document from May 1722, counsel’s opinion was asked whether 
trustees, who failed to collect dividends and who failed to sell the stock they held in trust at 
values higher than the monies lent out on that stock, were liable to make good the monies 
lost.
32 The hypothetical discussion contained in this document was clearly a trial argument to 
see if the blame for the estate trust losses could be pinned on the trustees and not on the Duke. 
                                                 
28 Portland was certainly at as a high, probably higher, social level than either Lord Londonderry or Chandos in 
1720. Yet the dealings of these two were more varied and sophisticated than are Portland’s dealings. It does not 
appear that his dealings had a logical direction except one based upon presumed advances, forever and upward, 
in South Sea shares values. For Londonderry’s and Chandos’s South Sea histories, see Neal, ‘“For God’s Sake, 
Remitt Me”’. 
29 I follow the usual convention in defining £100 nominal South Sea stock as one South Sea share. 
30 PL F2/6/179, page 12. 
31 Pw B 165, pages 23-4. The Earl of Warwick contract contained in Table 1 is one of these contracts and is 
dated 31 May 1720. 
32 PL F2/6/180.   17
The Duke’s next move was to borrow £8,000 and then £70,000 from the South Sea 
Company on the security of another 160 shares (20 shares transferred to South Sea Director 
Robert Surman and 140 shares transferred to a Mr. Shaw).
33 This is remarkable and shows 
that the Duke was especially favoured by the Company in the allocation of loans on stock in 
which the Company’s stated bye-laws on the loan programme stipulated that no more than 
£4,000 would be lent to anyone individual nor would monies be lent at a higher rate than 
£400 per pledged share.
34 A parallel record of these loans can be found in the South Sea 
Company’s ledger of the loans on stock. This was a document of some importance in the 
deliberations of the Parliamentary Committee of Secrecy at the end of 1720.
35 Under a 
heading for 13 June, the Duke is shown to have borrowed from the Company £84,000 (not 
£78,000) on the pledged security of 151 original shares and 20 shares in the first cash 
subscription. 
In the meantime the Duke was creating a number of forward purchase agreements with 
a wide range of people. From what contracts or drafts of contracts that exist (see Table 1) we 
see the Duke typically agreeing to repay money lent to him by individuals and in return 
receiving back from them some South Sea stock. The contracts also typically stated that the 
Duke would undertake the receipt of the stock (making him liable to an action on the case, if 
he were to default) and also stated that the other party held the stock in trust only as a trustee 
(also making that party liable to an action) and the money to be repaid was a loan to the Duke 
(additionally making the Duke liable to an action of debt). In some of the contracts an 
exchange of securities was specified. For example, a certain amount of South Sea securities 
in the counterparty’s hands could be sold if stock prices fell to a sufficiently low level. 
Sometimes these securities were to be held in trust by yet another party (e.g. the Sword Blade 
                                                 
33 This is probably Joseph Shaw, a broker with heavy dealings with the South Sea directors. Abstracts of his 
ledgers showing his dealings with the directors are found in Box 158, parchment collection, HLRO.  
34 There were several different packages of loans that were made to shareholders. The first was in late April and 
the so-called Third Loan was in June 1720.  See discussion of these loans in BL, Add. Ms. 25,499, Court 
Minutes.   18
Bank) and there could even be a provision that additional stock would be given to such 
trustees if stock prices fell. A final guarantee usually built into these contracts was the 
traditional double penal sum long found in written contracts of debt. Given the stupendous 
size of some of the Duke’s contracts, it is striking to see this penal sum provision retained in 
an unreduced form.
36
The Duke was active in forming forward purchase agreements in the spring of 1720, 
usually for settlement before the closing of the transfer ledgers at the end of June 1720. We 
have some evidence that the Duke was successful in fulfilling these contracts.
37 At the same 
time he was settling these earlier contracts, he was promising to undertake delivery of more 
stock at even higher prices for the opening of the Company’s ledgers at the end of August. 
He also formed some more long-term forward purchase agreements for settlement in the 
autumn and end of year 1720, with two more large contracts for settlement in March 1721. It 
was these latter contracts that were the largest and therefore potentially the most ruinous to 
the Duke’s fortunes. 
In Table 1 we see three of the contracts that were to give Portland difficulties. There 
was first the relatively long-term forward purchase agreement with Edward Eure. The 
manuscripts show that Eure planned to make a good tender of shares to Portland, for there is 
a letter from Eure to Portland commanding his presence on 21 March 1721 to take receipt of 
the 50 shares for the contract price of £1,000 p.s.
38 But elsewhere we find a signed statement 
by three clerks of the South Sea Company that 21 March was not a regular transfer day, 
therefore to make a good tender Eure would have had to attend at the South Sea House all 
day, which he did not do.
39
                                                                                                                                                       
35 An abstract of the ledgers of the loan on stock, Box 157, parchment collection, HLRO. 
36 We shall see later that a penal sum of £200,000 originating from the Duke’s two £50,000 forward purchase 
agreements with George Caswall was the final claim still in dispute between Caswall and the second Duke in 
1741. 
37 Pw B 165 is filled with descriptions of the terms under which these contracts were settled. 
38 Pw B 143. 
39 PL F2/6/145. The tender of shares had to be made at South Sea House where the transfer ledgers were lodged.   19
In a number of the Portland cases it is alleged, at least as a trial argument, that good 
tender of stock was not made at the stipulated time. The argument appears in a number of 
unrelated cases found in the English Reports as well. If these are to be believed and 
incredible as it may seem, some number of people, who had the opportunity to sell shares 
from £900 to £1,000 p.s. when shares were worth only about £150 p.s., apparently passed up 
the opportunity to do so.
40 In other papers we see the Duke’s advisors checking that the Eure 
contract was properly registered and that Eure was actually in possession of sufficient stock 
to make the tender when the contract was signed. These were all requirements under the 1721 
Act 7 Geo. 1, stat. 2 and were systematically checked for in many other contracts to which 
Portland was a party.
41 The Eure contract, if fairly settled, would have cost Portland about 
£43,000 net and he could have been liable for £100,000 in a penal sum in the worst case 
scenario. 
The second contract that gave the Duke trouble was the contract for £17,600 with John 
Edwin. Edwin and his brother (Charles) adopted a particularly aggressive and 
noncompromising stance towards the Duke. The first discoverable communications from 
these brothers to Portland were in the most threatening tones.
42 We know also that they were 
the most active in trying to build legal coalitions against Portland amongst his other contract 
partners.
43 They even tried latterly to have Portland’s goods and chattels distrained.
44 There 
                                                 
40 We later see that Sir John Meres actually did this because, as he wrote, he thought it was accommodating to 
Portland to be allowed more time to settle with Meres. Perhaps other contracting parties felt the same way. 
Certainly Caswall’s correspondence with the Duke regarding Portland’s account with the Sword Blade bank 
also expresses this sentiment. cf. fn. 59.    
41 Such references are found in a number of places, but mostly in PL F2/6/145. 
42 Pw B 36-7. 
43 In March 1722 Sir John Meres (Pw B 57 and Pw B 64/1) was asked by the Edwins to join them in suits 
against the Duke. Similarly, in Pw B 74-8, Thomas Wynne plaintively wrote to the Duke just before his 
departure for Jamaica that he was being pressurised by the “unmerciful Edwins” to join them against the Duke. 
For his contract with the Duke, see Pw B 164 (Appendix 1). In their letters to the Duke, Charles and John 
Edwin state that they have successfully brought others into their hounding of the Duke. On 14 October they 
remind him their affairs with him involve others quite prominent, “one is a gentleman of Norfolk a relation of 
Mr Walpoles & Neighbor of Lord Townsends who has very little to do in the South Sea affairs except in this 
unfortunate transaction with your Grace, another is a Daughter of your neighbour Sir Roger Hill who has once 
had the honour to be acquainted with her Grace the Duchess, a third is a Lady of her acquaintance.” Pw B 36. 
44 PL F2/7/7, a letter reference to a writ of distringas, purchased by the Edwins, which was in the hands of the 
Sheriff of Buckinghamshire in December 1725   20
                                                
are two contracts with Sir George Caswall in the table, the second being just a compounding 
of the first contract. To that contract we must add two others, both for 50 shares at £1,000 
p.s., each with £200,000 penal sums contained therein.
45 These were the main contracts that 
the Duke, his widow and his successor, the second Duke fought so strenuously to renege 
upon throughout the 1720’s and, in the case of the Caswall contracts, as late as 1741. On the 
contracts to Eure, Edwin and Caswall alone Portland’s net liability would have been about 
£180,000 if fairly settled. Added to that there would have been about another £100,000 in net 
liability stemming from all his other unfavourable forward purchase agreements that we have 
discovered. His potential liabilities from these contracts would have been a very large portion 
of his potential net worth at that time and may have well sunk the entire Portland fortune if 
they had been fully honoured.
46
 
45 cf. fn. 66. 
46 Dunthorne and Onnekink report that the value of his father’s estate was about £850,000 when it was passed to 
the Duke in 1709. The estate was heavily encumbered with debts even prior to the South Sea Bubble. See PL 
F2/6/106-110. Table 1                                                                    Contracts in the Portland(London) Manuscripts 
Acc. No.  Date  Stock  Payment Settlement Terms  Seller 
          
PL F2/6/111  23 April 1720  £2,000  £6,400  12 Aug 1720 or next opening  Charles Ottway 
PL F2/6/112  16 May 1720  £2,000  £8,200  On or before Xmas 1720  Thomas Seabright 
PL F2/6/113  1 June 1720  £1,000  £6,400  On or before next closing  Earl of Uxbridge 
PL F2/6/114  31 May 1720  £1,000  £7,050  On or before next shutting or within 3 days of the opening  Earl of Warwick 
PL F2/6/115  1 June 1720  £3,000 1
st Sub  £12,000  For the opening  Henry Temple 
PL F2/6/116  1 June 1720  £2,000  £12,800  On or before next shutting  Richard Bayliss 
PL F2/3/117  1 June 1720  £2,000  £11,600  On or before next shutting  Thomas Martin 
PL F2/6/118  1 June 1720  £1,000  £5,900  On or before next shutting  John Shurkbrugh 
PL F2/6/119  1 June 1720  £1,000  £9,350  For the opening  Sir William Gage 
PL F2/6/120  10 June 1720  £5,000  £50,000  On or before 25 March 1721  Edward Eure 
PL F2/6/121  28 June 1720  £1,000  £10,000  Within 14 days of opening  Alexander Gordon 
PL F2/6/122  18 June 1720  £2,000 1
st Sub  £10,000  On demand (the Duke executes almost immediately)  Robert Surman 
PL F2/6/123  23 June 1720  £1,000  £8,900  For the opening  John Marke, goldsmith 
PL F2/6/124  23 June 1720  £1,500  £13,875  For the opening  Daniel Carroll 
PL F2/6/125  23 June 1720  £1,000  £6,650  For the opening  Isaac Hern. Nunes 
PL F2/6/126  23 June 1720  £1,000  £6,550  For the opening  Phosaunt Crisp 
PL F2/6/127  23 June 1720  £1,000  £8,900  For the opening  John Marke 
PL F2/6/128  23 June 1720  £5,000  £33,000  For the opening  Sir George Caswall 
PL F2/6/129  2 July 1720  £3,000 1
st Sub  £11,000  Within 8 days of the opening  Thomas Martin 
PL F2/6/130  22 Aug 1720  £1,100  £7,300  On 23 Nov 1720  Isaac Hern. Nunes 
PL F2/6/131  23 Aug 1720  £3,500  £22,000  On or before 24 Nov 1720  William Bowles 
PL F2/6/132  23 Aug 1720  £3,000  £17,600  On or before 23 Nov 1720  John Edwin 
PL F2/6/133  23 Aug 1720  £5,500  £36,300  On or before 24 Nov 1720  Sir George Caswall 
PL F2/6/134  23 Aug 1720  £1,100  £7,200  On or before 24 Nov 1720  Phosaunt Crisp 
21  
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VI. Portland’s Defence 
 
 
What defensive stratagems did Portland adopt? One thing that is clear from the manuscripts 
is a substantial uniformity in his contracts. If he could not discover a legal stratagem that 
would defeat them all, they would have to be defeated piecemeal, with perhaps the weakest 
opponents being singled out for the most ruthless dismissal. There is strong evidence that 
Portland’s advisors chose their adversaries in this way. They of course opposed those persons 
who posed the greatest threats to the Bentinck fortune. They ignored the claims of those who, 
out of post-Crash poverty, were too weak to pursue Portland legally.
47  The first thing was to 
discover every potential opponent’s weaknesses. Portland’s lawyers, directed by John Lucas, 
were first ordered to check each contract thoroughly to see if had been properly registered at 
the South Sea House as stipulated in 7 Geo 1, stat. 2. Second, every possible bit of evidence, 
no matter how far fetched, that would show that a forward seller was not diligent in the 
proper presentation of his claims to the Duke was gathered. Finally, the best legal opinion of 
the day was polled on the validity of the contracts themselves. 
It is in the statements of strategic legal opinion that we find the most interesting papers 
amongst the Portland manuscripts. Whilst pleas can be found in archives and whilst 
judgements can be found in the legal reports, it is rare to find a collection of communications 
between lawyers and clients in which a range of legal strategies is discussed. Such 
communications show the known extent to which legal opponents could use the law to 
achieve their purposes. Such documents appear in the Portland collection from about 
September 1721. At that time the prominent King’s Sergeant, Sir John Chesshyre,
 48 was 
asked to look over the Edwin contract and to give his opinions.
49
                                                 
47 Such were the fates of Alexander Gordon and the Duke’s agent and financial correspondent, Pheasunt Crisp. 
See Pw B 38-41 and Pw B 21. 
48 Lemmings, ‘Chesshyre, Sir John (1662–1738)’. Chesshyre was to become the King’s First Serjeunt in 1727. 
49 PL F2/6/200, reproduced here in full as Appendix 2. My thanks to Kathryn Summerwill who helped in the 
decipherment of Serjeunt Chesshyre’s difficult hand.   23
The legal questions and opinions are undisguisedly directed at defending against 
actions that might arise from the contract dated 23 August with John Edwin.
50 There is little 
joy in Sergeant Chesshyre’s opinions for the Duke. Amongst the “facts” put to the lawyer 
was that the £17600 the Duke was supposed to pay on 23 Nov 1720 for 30 South Sea shares 
was split into a loan of £16,000 and £1600 interest for 3 months. The claim is made that this 
amounts to a loan at an interest rate of 40 p.c. p.a. and is clearly usurious.
51 When asked 
whether the Duke could claim the statutes of usury, Chesshyre is quite clear that the 
agreement will not be looked upon as usurious merely on the Duke’s or any other person’s 
say-so.
52 He will have to prove the “Loan to be or having an usurious sum for 
forebearance...” and it must be “…in such a case the proofs be clear and manifest.”
53 
Chesshyre also warns in so many words that the Duke cannot simultaneously deploy all the 
legal weapons that he has at his disposal. If he is going to seek relief on the grounds of usury, 
he cannot simultaneously take Edwin to task for not performing on the contract. If the Duke 
were to claim that Edwin took unfair advantage of him under the terms of the contract, he 
would also affirm the contract’s legality. 
To set these arguments in their financial context, consider that when the contract was 
signed on 23 August, South Sea shares were worth about £750 p.s. One or both parties to the 
contract were clearly pessimistic about the future value of such shares on 23 November when 
the contract was to expire. £17,600 promised in payment for 30 shares would imply a 
delivery price of a little more than £580 p.s.  The facsimile contract, which Chesshyre was 
inspecting, specified that Edwin could sell the 30 shares he was holding if their value fell 
below £600 p.s. and the Duke would still guarantee that on 23 November he would pay 
Edwin the residual up to the fully specified £17,600. Certainly by the second re-opening of 
the firm’s share ledgers (12 September), South Sea share values had not fallen below £600 
                                                 
50 PL F2/6/132. 
51 App. 2, lines 1-16. 
52 App. 2, line 36, “Paroll proofs…will not be allowed...”   24
p.s. What the Duke’s legal advisors wanted to claim, however, was that Edwin had got rid of 
the 30 shares well before 12 September. This would have put Edwin into a double bind. In 
the first instance, the original contract stated that the shares were the Duke’s and Edwin was 
holding them in trust. Therefore the use of the shares for Edwin’s benefit would be against 
the terms of the contract. Secondly, by the time Chesshyre was doing his work, 7 Geo 1, stat. 
2 required that for contracts that had yet been unperformed, sellers of stock had to be in 
possession of adequate stock within six days of the contract’s date. If Edwin had disposed of 
the 30 shares too quickly, the Duke would be liable to purchase only the shares Edwin was 
actually in possession of within the six-day window around the contract date. These were the 
issues addressed to Chesshyre and to which he responded.
54
In his last advice, Chesshyre warned the Duke that if he claimed there were wrongful 
advantages to Edwin resulting from his dealing in the Duke’s stock, he had better make sure 
that the advantages to Edwin actually exceeded the Duke’s liability to Edwin under the 
contract. For by making this argument, the Duke would again affirm the validity of the 
contract.
55 Such a balance was not very likely to be in the Duke’s favour. In a small book, 
which we might call an inventory and collection of memoranda about the Duke’s contracts, 
we find that Portland’s advisors had discovered, while looking at the South Sea stock ledgers, 
that Edwin was in possession of only 6 shares on 31 August 1720. The value of South Sea 
shares at the signing of the contract was about £750 p.s. and was certainly still above £600 
p.s. until about 14 September. So, according to the contract Edwin would have prematurely 
disposed of 24 shares he was holding for the Duke. But the maximum net advantage to 
Edwin of having done this (prior to further price declines below £600 p.s.) would be only 
24×(£750-£600) = £3600. Balanced against this the Duke, by affirming the contract, would 
have obliged himself to (at the very least) a liability to purchase the 6 shares for about £586 
                                                                                                                                                       
53 App. 2, lines 40 and 53. 
54 App. 2, lines 18-22, 29-30 and 61-70.  
55 App. 2, lines 77-80.   25
p.s., when they were worth then only about £150 p.s. The danger of admitting to this liability 
is that Edwin might even still later prove that he had control of all the required 30 shares by 
trust arrangements with others. At least this was the claim made by Edwin that was noted in 
another source.
56
In the end, Edwin may or may not have fulfilled his side of his contract, but the Duke 
was in the position of having to affirm the validity of the contract in order to discover in 
court whether this was true or not. What did he do? We have not yet discovered the full 
proceedings of Edwin against the Duke; all we know so far is that they were strenuous and 
threatening and from this we might guess that Edwin was pursuing the Duke for full 
performance of the contract, plus costs, at least. This would have been an obligation to 
repurchase all 30 shares for £17,600 when they were worth only £4500. Furthermore, Edwin 
might have pursued the Duke for the penal sums resulting from default on the contract, 
£35,200. In an undated memorandum we see noted only some instructions to delay the 
Edwins’ actions by presenting a bill to relieve the Duke of his contract with Edwin on the 
grounds of usury and improper use and benefit of the 30 shares – precisely the two grounds 
that Chesshyre warned should not be used simultaneously.
57
We have outlines of how the Duke was planning to proceed against his other 
antagonists. We have seen that against Edwin and Crisp the Duke was going to proceed on 
the grounds that, under 7 Geo 1, stat. 2, these persons were deficient in the stock they needed 
to have when the contracts were signed. There were also a few instances in which his 
advisors believed they had discovered that contracts had not been properly registered, as 
required under that Act. The most important instance of this concerned the Duke’s first 
contract with Sir George Caswall. Our sources suggest that his legal advisors thought that 
                                                 
56 PL F2/6/137. 
57 PL F2/6/145. Because the memorandum is undated, it may very well have predated Chesshyre’s advice. The 
same document shows that the Duke intended to give Pheasunt Crisp the same treatment he was going to mete 
out to the Edwins. The similar contract with Crisp (PL F2/6/134, Table 1) was to be opposed on the same 
grounds – usury and not having enough stock within six days of the contract date.    26
usury was still useful grounds for relief against the contracts with Edwin, Caswall (3
rd 
contract), Crisp and Bowles. By far the most common defence that was deployed against the 
creditors, however, is that they failed to make good tender of stock to the Duke. This was to 
be used against Bowles, Meres, Nunes, Crisp, Eure, Seabright and Caswall.
58 We cannot yet 
be sure how far in advance or after Chesshyre’s advice that the Duke’s legal defences were 
fully operating, but we do know that from late 1720 and through much of 1722 the Duke was 
actively reneging and delaying his creditors. 
Not all creditors were successfully turned away, although many of the letters in the 
Portland archives are plaintive appeals to the Duke. The best preserved collection of letters is 
from Sir John Meres. Alternatively begging, cringingly obsequious and threatening, the 
Meres letters to Portland provide some of the best amusement to be found in any South Sea 
archive. That they were ultimately successful with the Duke may be due to their writer’s 
persistence, but it is more probable that, as one of the six clerks in Chancery, Meres was 
ideally placed to advance his claims against Portland along a legal fast-track  - or so he 
would occasionally darkly threaten. 
“Feb 15 1721 - My Lord Duke, I may now reasonably Compute that besides the loss of 
£11170 by the 1st and 2nd Subscriptions which I bought & fairly advanced & paid for 
to your Grace, I have lost about the value of £5000 by your Grace's Neglect or delay of 
Accepting the South Sea Stock which you Bought of Me. 
 
I will not trouble Yo'r Grace again with Circumstances or a long Letter, tho' it might be 
usefull to Your Self & other Sufferes by the South Sea Directors, because I hear the 
length of my last was Complain'd of: And if I may not be admitted the honour of 
Discoursing with You, or hearing from Yo'r self on this Occasion, I shall not trouble 
Yr'r Grace any further than by such or better Agents than You have used towards Mee, 
if You can think I have deserved no better from You, who (to my great Loss & 
Inconvience in whatever I have transacted with Yo'r Grace) have shew'd myself to be 
with all respect & kind intention towards YOU! 
 
I have already intimated to Your Grace how this matter may be made easy, & it will be 
entirely owing to Your Unkindness if I am any way troublesome or pressing; tho' I 
meet with no favour on the like Occasions. 
 
Your Grace has brought me under a necessity of doing the same things Thrice already 
that I might be Supplied with Money for Performing my Contracts with others: And I 
                                                 
58 PL F2/6/137 and PL F2/6/145, memoranda and observations concerning contracts.   27
must once more raise Money at any loss before the Books of the South Sea Company 
will be again Open'd; however I give Your Grace this Timely Notice that I will so soon 
as the South Sea Books shall be Open'd for that Purpose Transfer a 2d time or tender to 
be transferred to your Grace, or Your Order the £3500 South Sea Stock at the price of 
£22000, which I pray you to accept, or Cause to be Accepted accordingly; It is 




This was a typical and, by Meres’s standards, not a long-winded effort to get satisfaction 
from the Duke. In March and April of 1722 Meres sent one begging or threatening letter after 
another to the Duke. He wrote that he had a series of unsatisfactory meetings with the Duke’s 
representatives and that the ever redoubtable Edwin brothers had been at him to join in a 
coalition against the Duke.
60
Some further light is shed upon Meres’ frustration and irritation with the Duke by the 
pleading he filed in Chancery at this time.
61 In this document he complained to the Lord 
Chancellor that Portland was using Meres’ loss of a promissory note to claim that the note 
never existed in the first place. This was not just any promissory note, but was the very note 
by which the Duke had promised to pay the £22,000 referred to in his letter above. The 
existence and validity of this note is evidenced in numerous places in the Portland papers. In 
the pleading, Meres asked the Court to compel the Duke to produce the witnesses and 
evidence for the note, which he knew existed. Meres’ persistence soon obtained results to his 
satisfaction for he wrote on 5 June 1722, “My Lord Duke, Permit Me once more to Kiss Yo’r 
Grace’s hand…..”
62 in thanks for all the ways in which his demands had been met. His 
descriptions of these devices were incomplete, but we do know that earlier (21 March 1721) 
the Duke had somehow arranged for Meres to purchase (for £5,000) a £8,000 judgement 
against the Duke that had been enrolled in 1718.
63 Meres had before acknowledged that 
£5,000 was a bargain price for the judgement because, from the time he had obtained it, other 
                                                 
59 Pw B 48. 
60 Pw B 55-61. 
61 NA, C11/852/14, 21 March 1722. 
62 Pw B 63.   28
enemies of the Duke (again, the Edwin brothers) had offered more than £6,000 for it.
64 Meres 
related in his June 1722 letter the final arrangements by which the judgement was released to 
him. He also mentioned a series of other notes and securities from the Duke that had been 
finally accepted by Meres’ creditors.
65
The Duke’s settlement with Meres was probably quite an expensive one. In a series of 
agreements brokered by Pheasant Crisp, the Duke had agreed to buy £3,500 South Sea Stock 
(35 shares) and £1,000 each of receipts in the first and second South Sea subscriptions. By 
late November 1720 when all these agreements should have been settled, the stocks the Duke 
had agreed to buy would have been worth no more than £9,000, but he had agreed to pay 
nearly £32,000 for them. A realistic net liability to Sir John Meres thus would have been on 
the order of £20,000. Meres was clearly such a dangerous adversary with a large, but not too 
large, claim upon the Duke’s assets that he had to be satisfied. Although Meres might have 
shared some losses with the Duke and others in the South Sea Bubble, he was in the end not 
financially disabled. Later in the 1720’s he was to remain active in finance and business as an 
officer in the Royal African Company (subGovernor) and York Buildings Company 
(Governor). 
There was one dangerous antagonist whose claims the Duke clearly could not afford to 
satisfy, Sir George Caswall. It was not until the 1730’s that Sir George Caswall, co-partner 
with Jacob Sawbridge and Elias Turner in the Sword Blade Bank, began to use legal means 
to press his claims. Amongst the Portland legal papers of the 1730’s we find a “rough draft of 
the defendant’s case and proofs” in which there is a copy of letter dated to mid1722 in which 
Caswall lays before the Duke the totality of the Sword Blade’s claims, 
                                                                                                                                                       
63 PL F2/7/30.  
64 Pw B 64/1. An enrolled judgement would be a debt senior to other debts, such as the rest of the Duke’s debts 
to Meres. A judgement would not only be paid first, but would also be useful as a legal weapon with which to 
harry the Duke. It is thus quite telling of the Duke’s financial problems in 1721 that his highest grade debt had a 
market discount of at least 25 p.c. 
65 We do not know what the complete accounting of these arrangements were, but we do know that amongst 
them was the assignment to Meres of the fee farm rents of Wingham in Kent that Meres would later sell on for 
£3400. We also know that a number of East India bonds were sold for Meres’ benefit. See PL E8/6/34,43.   29
“A Copy of the letter & Account vizt. 
Rt Honourable 
 
My Lord the very great calamity that hath befallen all persons concerned in Stocks hath 
in a more particular manner been exceeding grievious to my self & Copartners for over 
& above the loss of money we have suffered the disgrace of doing that which in the 
course of 22 years trade we never did before I mean to refuse paying what we owed at 
demand whereby we have lost 20,000L p.annm. 
 
I have delayed sending your account untill this time because I was persuaded your 
Grace would cause all your accounts to be stated that you might know what condition 
your Grace's affairs were in to satisfy the demands upon you The generality I shewed 
your Grace in the agreements we made with you I doubt not will plead our cause and as 
we had no views of dissrving your Grace for you might have made large advantages by 
what you did with us so I can say we shall be as willing as any of your creditors to do 
the kind part by you I have been a great many times to wait on your Grace at your own 
house tho in vain I have therefore sent you this letter with your account with us & beg 
your Grace's answer in writing and commands when & where I shall wait on you being 
      Your Grace's very sincere and Humble Servant 
      G e o r g e   C a s w a l l  
 
To his Grace Henry Duke of Portland present 
    His Grace Henry Duke of Portland Debit 
To Cash on.....5500 S Sea due 24 November....................36300 
To ditto...........5500 ditto due 29 Septem…......................50000 
To ditto...........5500 ditto due 23 Decem...........................50000 
To ditto.............600 ditto Ballance of his Account Stock 
                ______          _______ 
17100                   136300     
To ditto         10000 ditto Deposit on your Grace's & sundry other account 
          deduct for Ballance of his Acct cash 943L14s11d 
          Interest of 1600L E.I. bonds receiv'd    21L11s9d      965L6s8d 
       ____________    __________ 
                            135334L13s4d”
66
 
   A net claim upon Portland’s estate in excess of £135,000 was certainly the greatest 
single liability against which he had to defend himself. From numerous sources it is plain that 
Caswall took no legal action during the Duke’s lifetime, although the same sources allude to 
frequent attempts to negotiate settlements to the dispute. As a member of the House of Lords 
and as a serving Royal officer on mission in Jamaica, the Duke’s person was inviolable in 
actions of debt at Common Law, but there is no apparent reason why Caswall could not have 
followed a strategy similar to that followed by Meres – harassing the Duke for reply and 
                                                 
66 PL F2/6/313.   30
evidence in equity and establishing a record of complaint and evidence before useful 
witnesses and records disappeared. The Duke died in 1726 and thereafter the Duke’s 
creditors’ best remedies would be found in equity against his executors and heirs. The second 
Duke, William, would not reach his majority until 1730 and in the meantime Henry’s widow, 
Elizabeth, was the executrix of his estate, which she would remain until her death in 1736 
and William became sole heir.
67
We have not found one coherent source that describes Caswall’s attacks and Portland’s 
defences through the courts. A painstaking comparison of the papers found in the Portland 
manuscripts with public court records appears now to be the only way to find out 
conclusively what happened.
68 From the Portland manuscripts perspective only, however, we 
have the best evidence of the strategy behind the Duke’s defences. The bulk of the papers 
from the late 1720’s and well into the 1730’s show that the Duke’s representatives defended 
against Caswall and other creditors by tying up vulnerable assets in trust. Prior to his 
departure to the Governorship of Jamaica, Portland created a new strict settlement of the 
remainder of the estate trust for his children. This had to be done with care in 1721 because if 
an executor or an heir later failed to successfully plead the exclusion from creditors of assets 
from the deceased Duke’s estate, the establishment of the estate trust could be construed as 
an attempt to circumvent the statute against fraudulent devises. Such a failure could 
potentially further expose the estate to charges from creditors of the deceased ancestor.
69
                                                 
67 A portion of the estate was created for younger sons in the first Duke’s 1704 marriage settlement. After the 
first Duke’s death, Elizabeth petitioned (see Bentinck, 1726) for a Private Bill to remove and manage that 
portion of the settlement for the benefit of her second son (George, b. 1715) until he should reach his majority.  
That portion of the estate was thus protected from the actions by the first Duke’s creditors. See Private Bill 
1Geo. 2, c.5, An Act to Enable the Guardians of the Lord George Bentinck…. 
68 The National Archives are making great strides in converting finding aids for courts of law and equity into 
electronic forms. So far, however, most progress has been made in making equity court pleadings name-
searchable by defendant and plaintif. The finding aids for Common Pleas and King’s Bench, however, are still 
quite cumbersome to use. cf. fn. 85. It would seem strange that a trail of public records for such a series of 
important cases such as the Duke’s would be hard to find, but without some foreknowledge of what courts and 
in what sessions hearings took place and without the names under which the cases were filed, it is a difficult 
task indeed. 
69 See 3 Will. & Mary, c. 14, 1691, An Act for Relief of Creditors against Fraudulent Devises. For discussion of 
pleas in defence of creditors’ bills against estate heirs in equity, see also Langdell’s “A brief survey of the 
equity jurisdiction.”   31
It appears that Caswall bided his time before he launched his legal attack on the 
Portland interests. His path would have certainly been eased by the Duke’s death in 1726 in 
Jamaica, for it would have widened his options for action in equity, but we see no evidence 
that he immediately began an attack on either the Portland estate’s executrix, Elizabeth, or 
the estate trustees. Not until 1735 and 1736 was he purchasing writs of distringas in 
Buckinghamshire (as the Edwin brothers did in 1725) to accompany his pleadings in 
Exchequer. One object of his actions was to force Elizabeth to produce an inventory of the 
Portland estate as it would pass to the ultimate heir, the second Duke. When this inventory 
was eventually produced, it was quite small (less than £7,000) because it clearly excluded all 
lands and land-derived incomes – as if such assets were not going to pass to the second Duke 
by descent.
70 This was a clear premonition of one defensive device the second Duke was to 
subsequently use; he would plead that the bulk of the estate did not come to him by descent 
(the plea, riens per descent) and thus was not assets available to his father’s creditors. We 
have already described the dangers of making a false plea of riens per descent and this is the 
setback that William eventually suffered in Exchequer. To see why this might have happened, 
we have to go back to the 1720 and the first Duke’s relationship with the Portland settled 
estate.  
We have already visited the issue of Portland’s relations with his estate’s trustees.
71 
There are papers dating from 1722 in which the idea is tested of shifting the blame of estate 
losses towards the trustees and away from Portland.
72 This argument was still alive and was 
raised, as if it were of some possible use, even in 1739. Portland’s paid legal advisors were 
disdainful of its merits and later we find evidence that the estate’s trustees were indemnified 
by the second Duke for any losses to the estate that their actions may have led to. The 
apparent reason for doing this was so the trustees could be better used as witnesses in the 
                                                 
70 Details of writs, pleadings and the inventory referred to are found in PL F2/6/225,226. Elizabeth died March 
1736. 
71 cf. fn. 31, section V and related discussion on page 16.   32
Duke’s defence. The second Duke greatly needed such witnesses because he faced several 
problems in defending the 1721 settlement of the estate; his legal advisors were quite divided 
as to whether it was a good settlement or not. The crux of the issue was whether the first 
Duke in 1720 had a) acted in concert with the trustees in applying the trust’s cash for allowed 
uses or b) whether the Duke had merely borrowed money from the trust. In the latter case, 
the money would be treated as personal estate and would be available to creditors. In the 
former case, the money would be simply the Duke’s debt to the estate. Several advisors were 
looking at the same hypothetical case document reproduced in Appendix 3. In the opinion of 
John Browne (KC and MP for Dorchester) if the Duke was not actually a borrower from the 
original estate, the resettlement of the estate upon his son would be fraudulent and void as it 
would appear that it was done merely to avoid the claims of creditors. “…the principall 
Difficulty & defect in the Case seems to be the Slight Evidence of John Strongs having really 
borrowed the 10000L...”
73 In another opinion “…it seems to be an agreement between the X 
and the Trustees to layout the 10000 in the Purchase of Stock…& if this should come out to 
be the case it may be of very ill consequence to the family…”
74 Finally, in the opinion of no 
less than Sir Dudley Ryder, the Attorney General,  
“I think on the whole of this transaction the placing out the trust money in the purchase 
of SS Stock at 500 p cent cannot be considered as a Loan on governmt. securitys 
according to the trust & therefore was a breach of trust & as Jo Strong was not only a 
party to it but procured it to ease himself he would be bound in Equity to make it good 
the consequence of which is that the settlement made by him of his own estate to repair 
the Loss was on valueable consideration not void as to creditors & therefore that Robert 
the Son did not take that estate by Descent from his father. but How far he may safely 
plead riens per descent will I think depend on the Evidence he is capable of giving of 
the nature of the transaction. As to the Remainder in Fee it being after an Estate Tail 
which he barred it has no assets 
 
As to the estate purchas't with the 10000L if that appears to be the fact I am of opinion 
it was well settled & therefore no assetts of Jo Strong. 
 
As to the trustees being Evidence I rather think they cannot because it is to discharge 
themselves of the trust money by the purchase of the Stock, to gett themselves 
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73 PL F2/6/220. 
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indemnify'd so far as the value of the Estate against their breach of trust but this is not 
quite clear. 
 
       D   R y d e r  




After the controversial settlement, the first Duke departed for his well-remunerated 
Governorship of Jamaica. It was not a very successful sojourn, nor in the end did the Duke 
live long enough to much benefit from the salary.
76 The portion of the estate strictly settled 
on his son may have remained safe, but the portion that the Duke managed to expose to the 
deterioration in the South Sea appeared, in his lawyers’ eyes, to have remained “assets” 
available to creditors. 
Caswall’s direct attacks upon William, as sole heir to the estate, started in late 1737. 
From this point forward, we have more than just the Portland manuscripts to guide us. We 
have also the record of rules and orders coming out of Exchequer.
77 In November 1737 the 
Buckinghamshire sheriff summoned the second Duke to answer one of Caswall’s bills in 
Exchequer.
78 We have not yet discovered Caswall’s pleadings in Exchequer, but we have the 
Portland manuscripts copies of them and they claim the penal sums for non-performance on 
the three contracts described in his original letter (reproduced above) of 1722 to the first 
                                                 
75 PL F2/6/218. There is a note on the verso of this document that the Mr Attorney General was due 2 guineas 
for this opinion. For Ryder’s career see, Lemmings, ‘Ryder, Sir Dudley (1691–1756)’. 
76 He was appointed in September 1721, but did not arrive in Jamaica until December 1722. At the Crown’s 
request, the Jamaican Assembly reluctantly granted him an expenses/salary budget of £5,000 p.a., twice the 
usual £2,500 p.a., received by Governors of Jamaica. He unsuccessfully negotiated with the Assembly on 
revenue bills. He had poor relations with the Royal Navy establishment in Jamaica and had even tried to 
alleviate the problems of piracy with direct offers of grants and pardons to pirates. In short, he had all the usual 
problems of Jamaican governors in this period. He also experienced the usual death of Jamaican governors; 
fatal disease was rarely a lingering disease and he was quickly carried off by a fever on 4 July 1726. Neither 
was his sojourn in Jamaica financially successful. Although the Jamaican Assembly, upon his wife’s petition, 
made good the remnants of the Duke’s salary, her requests for relief from the Duke’s accumulated debts met 
with rebuff. See Cundall, The Governors of Jamaica…, Chapter 7. An official sojourn in the Caribbean to 
escape creditors and to make money was common. It was a ploy nearly undertaken by Thomas Pitt the elder in 
1717 and undertaken by Lord Londonderry in 1727. See Larry Neal’s “The Money Pitt”. 
77 This is series NA, E12. 
78 PL F2/6/225 in the Portland manuscripts. Corroborating evidence comes from the 1738 entries in the 
Exchequer series NA, E12/40.   34
Duke.
79 In June 1739 we know that the court was moved that Portland be allowed to plead 
that “the deed was not the Duke’s and the plaintif did not tender stock.” There follow several 
notices of trial and motions for delay until it appears that 14 May 1741 was to be the day of 
reckoning. For that day there are notices to the South Sea Company to prepare to deliver 
transfer ledgers for 1720, cash books and the register of contracts to be at the court’s disposal. 
Paperwork was also ordered to trace the accounts of not only Caswall, but also those of the 
Portland trustees (Eyles, Eyles and de Gols).
80  
What happened? By this time Sir George’s son was contesting the action alone. Perhaps 
Sir George was too ill to attend to his legal affairs, although he was not to die until the 
autumn of 1742. In a memorandum of 16 July 1741 of a meeting between the Duke’s counsel 
and the younger Caswall, Caswall apparently tried to come to some salvaging arrangement 
with the Duke. “That if it had been in his power he would deliver up that contract {referring 
here to PL F2/6/133} as well as the other two which he did deliver to the Duke and that he 
was ever ready if the Duke desir’d to make an assignment of said two contracts…. That Sir 
George does not know of his giving up the Contracts to his Grace…That the mony he has 
expended in the suit has been more than he ever had from his father in his Life since 16 years 
old.” These passages are the only existing evidence of an attempted settlement between the 
antagonists. Perhaps the younger Caswall was proposing to accept payment for the contracts, 
or perhaps such a payment had already changed hands.    
Why should Caswall have attempted a settlement? Not everything had gone against the 
Caswall suit. In a fortuitous reminiscence more than thirty years after the events, Lord Chief 
Justice Mansfield recalled that, when he was but a junior member of the Duke’s defence team, 
the Duke had suffered a ruling that his plea of riens per descent was a false plea and this 
opened the way for Caswall to enter a claim for the £200,000 penal sums attached to the two 
                                                 
79 PL F2/6/230, dated 1738. 
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contracts referred to in the passage above.
 81 By making an analogy between the Caswall case 
and the case on which he was ruling in 1773, Mansfield revealed something about the course 
of the suit in 1741. First, he stated that the basis of the false plea ruling was trifling matter; 
there had been some small error in the accounting of the assets the second Duke had received 
by descent, but it was not the intent of the statute against fraudulent devises that such small 
errors should open the heir’s estate to the whole debt. With these remarks Mansfield also 
revealed that Caswall had some success in establishing that debt and that it was not a small 
debt. The proceedings in May 1741 were either postponed or incomplete because there were 
fresh rulings for the formation of a new jury in June.
82 This was probably the jury, which 
Caswall complained, was not allowed to judge his suit. He “had heard the Judg had sent for 
the Record the night before the tryall to his chamber…{and}…That if it had been left to the 
Jury he was sure he should have had a verdict.”
83 Apparently some settlement between the 
antagonists along the lines suggested in the July memorandum was arranged, although we 
cannot find the details of it in the Portland manuscripts, since the last mention of the case is a 




VII. Conclusions and Directions for Further Research 
 
The primary goal of this paper was to begin an examination of the mechanics by which 
private financial contracts were settled in the wake of the South Sea Bubble. There is a 
natural and unavoidable bias, however, in the historical sources that we must use since 
disputed financial contracts tend to leave behind a richer historical record than amicably 
settled contracts would tend to do. In Banner’s seminal work on early security regulation we 
                                                 
81 Lofft, Reports of cases adjudged in the Court of King’s Bench, page 263. 
82 NA, E12/41. Perhaps there were problems in jury selection. In an early June ruling Caswall was ordered to 
show cause as to why he should object to presence of nonjurors in his jury. 
83 PL F2/6/312. 
84 NA, E12/41.   36
find a description of the legal principles that were in existence and developed afterwards, but 
what we really wish to know is how well these principles worked in practice in the settlement 
of disputes. The South Sea Bubble period should be a particularly fruitful in producing 
examples of legal proceedings arising from financial disagreements, but we admittedly start 
here with an examination of cases that were probably not typical of the cases produced in this 
period. The Duke of Portland’s disputes were numerous and involved huge sums of money. 
In monetary terms the cases may have well been amongst the largest generated by the South 
Sea Bubble. The historical record of his disputes is unusual in that it pertains to a number of 
disputed contracts with a variety of people. It also contains expert opinion upon the proper 
legal strategies for Portland to follow. A broader survey of financial disputes arising from the 
South Sea Bubble will have to depend, however, upon sources very different from the 
Portland sources. 
We believe that most South Sea cases would probably have been actions on debt in 
Common Law courts, not Equity. The debts in dispute would probably have been of 
considerable size and thus it would be more likely they were actioned in the Court of King’s 
Bench, rather than Common Pleas. A survey of disputes that came into the Court of King’s 
Bench, just before and after the South Sea Bubble, will probably reveal more about the 
common run of disputes than will a study of large disputes such as Portland’s, but the 
challenges presented to such a study will be formidable. The records of the Common Law 
courts for the 1720’s are much less accessible than are the records for the courts in Equity in 
the same period.
85 The search also may not uncover a huge number of cases because the 
1720’s sit very close to a period of a great decline in civil litigation near the middle of the 
                                                 
85 Court of King’s Bench judgements and their finding aids from this period, such as the Entry Books for 
judgements (NA, KB 168) or the Rule Books (NA, KB 125) are all written in a legal Latin and typically 
recorded (with numerous specialised abbreviations) in a very small legal hand, a descendant of the court hand of 
medieval scriptography.   37
eighteenth century.
86 In contrast to the period right after the collapse of the Railway Mania, 
the South Sea Bubble may not have caused a “hurricane of litigation”.
87 Nevertheless, hidden 
in the relatively smaller amount of private litigation there might actually be a high proportion 
of cases that stem from the South Sea Bubble. Until the results of a broader survey can 
temper our conclusions, we here attempt what conclusions we can as regards the state of law 
in its attitudes towards financial litigants. 
It is hard to imagine that the first Duke of Portland, if he were alive today, could have 
possibly remained solvent after having undertaken such a series of large and uniformly ill-
advised financial contracts as he undertook in 1720.
88  The Bentinck/Portland house has only 
recently expired with the 9
th Duke of Portland (d. 1981), but we have to conclude that the 
Bentinck direct line was able to continue its march towards ultimate extinction only on the 
backs of the eighteenth-century claimants to the Bentinck estate. There was an extensive 
uniformity in the basic structure of all the Portland contracts in Table 1 and elsewhere in the 
Portland Manuscripts. The Duke and his successor were nevertheless able to discriminate 
between claimants’ demands and strategically decide whose demands could be ignored, 
whose demands must be satisfied and whose demands must be legally resisted. So far I have 
found no one who obtained large satisfaction from the Duke except Sir John Meres. 
Caswall’s claims appear to have been harmed by his reluctance to move quickly and 
aggressively against the Duke. Instead of appreciating Caswall’s hesitance, the Duke’s 
defence used Caswall’s delay to his own advantage. It is difficult therefore not to have 
wished the Edwin brothers well in their pursuit of the Duke – their brutal and 
                                                 
86 If there was a general rise in numbers of cases started and reaching advanced stages as a result of the Bubble, 
it would have to have been quite short-lived since it escaped notice in the survey performed by Brooks, The 
1720’s and 1730’s were characterised by very low levels of litigation. See Brooks, ‘Interpersonal conflict,’ pp. 
360-364. 
87 Kostal, Law and English Railway Capitalism, Chapter 2 (The Hurricane of Litigation), describes the litigation 
aftermath of the Railway Mania of 1844-5 and shows that the Railway Mania was directly responsible in a very 
large increase in civil litigation. 
88 It is also highly unlikely that the heirs of the late Lord Lovat could have suffered a worse financial fate in 
1720 than they suffered in 1995 when (mere) debt and the weight of modern death duties forced the sale of one 
of the oldest (13
th century) estates in the British Isles.    38
uncompromising approach was seemingly more fitting to the true dignity
89 of Henry 
Bentinck than the equally threatening, but more honeyed approach taken by Meres. 
In the hands of as a resourceful antagonist as the Duke of Portland, the provisions of 7 
Geo. 1, stat. 2 were weapons that could be effectively deployed to deny justice to claimants. 
The intent of the statute clearly was to draw a line under the South Sea Bubble by hastening 
an end to vexatious suits, but in the hands of the Portland legal team it could be used, and 
was used, to make financial lawsuits vexatious. To modern minds it is somewhat incredible 
that two cornerstones of Portland’s defence were the arguments that his creditors a) could not 
manage properly to ask the Duke to perform on his contracts and simultaneously b) could not 
manage to properly register their contracts as required under 7 Geo. 1, stat. 2. Yet these were 
the two arguments that were raised and refined repeatedly in the Portland papers in which 
legal strategies were rehearsed. But perhaps nothing more could have been expected of a 
duke in the early eighteenth century. Caswall’s struggles against Portland are reminiscent of 
the struggles Richard Cantillon had at the same time with the Lady Mary Herbert, another 
member of the aristocracy who would not honour her contracts apparently only because it 
would have been too expensive for her to do so.
90  
For private property rights in capital markets, 1720-1 was ‘the best of times, it was the 
worst of times.’ In three Acts, Parliament had radically intermeddled with public finance, 
company law and the security of contract. The public’s ultimate negative reaction to the first 
of these Acts
91 finally forced Walpole’s administration to put public finance on a footing that 
was stable and secure for more than a century afterwards. The second Act
92 forced the 
development of company law onto paths in which change could take place only very slowly. 
This may ultimately have had its benefits and certainly in many contemporary minds the 
                                                 
89 We must remember that Henry Bentinck, or at least some of his advisors, were willing to try the argument 
that long-term family servants (Eyles) and not the Duke were responsible for the misapplication of estate trust 
funds – an argument that not one of the Duke’s paid legal counsel was willing to countenance. 
90 Murphy, Richard Cantillon, Chapter 11. 
91 6 Geo 1, c. 4.   39
joint-stock form of incorporation was itself seen as a nuisance which needed to be restricted. 
On the other hand, joint-stock incorporation had previously been a popular way of organising 
business and so it is likely that the Bubble Act did reduce the ability and rights of certain 
persons to organise businesses into the forms they preferred. In the third Act,
93 Parliament 
sought to reduce the proliferation of lawsuits resulting from the South Sea Bubble, but this 
was clearly achieved at the cost of a reduction in the rights of creditors. 
Forward markets today usually work on principles that make parties to contracts as 
faceless as is possible, with no contract being more or less subject to settlement risk than any 
other. Such was not the case in 1720, however, when parties to forward contracts had to be 
very careful of whom they contracted with. The shocks delivered by the South Sea Bubble 
revealed a number of fault lines in law into which the rights of financial contractors could 
founder. If unilateral Acts of Parliament did not upset some of those rights, then others could 
be frustrated by financial defendants, especially if they were members of the aristocracy, who 
could find refuge in the complexities of the land law. The legal process itself was so slow or 
could be slowed to the point where the lives of litigants and witnesses alike could not outlast 
the length of the suits. A long time was to pass after 1720 before property rights in capital 
markets could be more fully achieved for people who wished to write speculative financial 
contracts.  
                                                                                                                                                       
92 6 Geo 1, c. 18, the Bubble Act. 
93 7 Geo. 1, stat. 2.   40
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1st Duke of Portland Misc. 9 South Sea Transactions 
 
[pages 1-2] 
His Grace the D of Portland   debit  per Contra  Credit 
 
To Sr Jn Eyles, M Jos Eyles &    By 16000 South Sea Stock 
Mr Comrade de Gols as Trustees  83575L7s6.5d  Transferr'd to them as a 
    for Mony advanc'd     
  Security for the 83575L7s6.5d 
[pages 3-4] 
His Grace the D of Portland   debit  per Contra  Credit 
 
To the South Sea Compy a Loan    By 2000 South Sea Stock 
at 4 p.c.  8000  transferr'd to R Surman 
    By the Mid Srm Divid: on 
To Interest thereof at 4 p.c.      the 2000 Stock 
 
    By 14000 South Sea Stock 
To the Loan of...............  70000    Transferr to Shaw by 
To the Int thereof at 5 p.c      Mr Knights order as Deposit 
 
[pages 5-6] 
His Grace the D of Portland   debit  per Contra  Credit 
to Mr Jn Edwin 
 
22 Sep 1720 To Mony Lent  16000  By 3000 South Sea Stock 
To Int agd: to be paid to  1600  Transferr'd to him as a 
him Dec 22 1720    Security 
 
[pages 7-8] 
His Grace the D of Portland  debit  per Contra  Credit 
to Mr Wm Bowles 
 
1720 To Mony Lent  20000  By 3500 South Sea Stock 
To Int: agreed to be paid      Transferr'd to him as 
him the {blank} 1720  2000    Security 
 
[pages 9-10] 
His Grace the D of Portland  debit  per Contra  Credit 
to Sr Jn Meers 
 
To Mony Lent  20000  By 3500 South Sea Stock 
To Int: agd to be paid him    Transferr to Mr Tho: 
the {blank} 1720  2000  Martin by Sr Jn Meers 
    order as a Security 
 
[pages 11-12] 
His Grace the D of Portland  debit  per Contra  Credit 
to Isaac Nunez   41
 
To Mony Lent  6000  By 1000 South Sea Stock 
In Int: till the openg: after    Transferr'd to him as 
Midsmr 1720  650    security 
To ditto to the {blank} of Nov  650  By 100 Stock for the Divd: at Midr: on 
      the sd 1000 Stock 
 
[pages 13-14] 
His Grace the D of Portland  debit  per Contra  Credit 
to Phest: Crisp 
 
To Mony Lent  5900  By 1000 South Sea Stock 
To In: thereof to the openg:    Transferr'd to him as a 
after Midsr: 1720  650    security 
To Int: thereof to the {blank}  650  By 100 Stock for the Div:d at Midsmr 
on 
      sd 1000 Stock 
 
[pages 15-16] 
His Grace the D of Portland  debit  per Contra  Credit 
to Sr George Caswall 
 
To Mony lent  30000  By 5000 South Sea Stock 
To Int to the openg: after    Transferr'd to him as 
Midsmr  3000    security for the sd 
     30000 
 
To Int: to the 24 Nov: 1720    By 500 Stock for the Mid 
for the sd 33000  3000  smr Divd on the sd 5000 
   stock 
    By 500 S Sea Stock deposd as 
additional 
   Security 
 
[pages 17-18] 
His Grace the D of Portland  debit  per Contra  Credit 
to Sr George Caswall 
 
To Mony agreed to be pd on the    By 5500 Stock to be 
29th of Sepr 1720 for the pur-    delivr'd the {blank} 
chase of 5000 South Sea Stock  50000 
with the Divd: thereon at 
Midsmr 1720 being 500 Stock 
at the rate of 1000 p. ct. 
 
To Mony agreed to be paid on    By 5500 South Sea Stock 
the 24th of Decr: for the like  50000  to be delivr'd the {blank} 
Stock and at the like Price 
 
[pages 19-20] 
His Grace the D of Portland  debit  per Contra  Credit   42
to Sr Tho: Sebright 
 
To Mony agreed to be pd for    By 2000 SS Stock to be 
2000 SS Stock to be Delivr'd    delivr'd 
his Grace on or before the  8200 
Openg: after Xmas 1720 at    By 200 Stock for the 




His Grace the D of Portland  debit  per Contra  Credit 
to Mr Ed Eure 
 
To Mony agreed to be paid for    By 5000 SS Stock to be 
5000 South Sea Stock to be    Delivr'd 
delivr'd on or before the 25
th  50000  By 500 Stock for the Midsmr: 
of March 1721 at the rate of    Divd: also to be delivr’d 
1000 p cent 
    By The Divid: at Xmas on the 5500 
   Stock 
 
[pages 23-24] 
Sword Blade Comp  debit  per Contra  Credit 
To His Grace the Dk: of Portland 
 
 Stock 
To South Sea Stock deposd: by    By {blank} 
his Grace the Ld Morpeth  4000 
By his Grace the Coll Darcey  2000 
By his Grace the Coll Cope  1000 
By His Grace the Cl Campbell  1000 
By His Grace the Gen Wade  2000 
By His Grace to Sr George 
 Caswall  500 
To Stock undeposited  100 
 
[pages 25-26] 
His Grace the D of Portland  debit  per Contra  Credit 
to Mr Robt: Surman 
 
To Mony Lent  10000  By 2000 of the 1st Sub 
To Int: thereof    receipt deposited with him 
 
[pages 27-28] 
His Grace the D of Portland  debit  per Contra  Credit 
To Tho: Wynn Esq   6100 
To Alexd: Gordon   4000 
To Mr Owen  {blank}
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The Fictitious Case of Ellis vs. Davis: Similar to Edwin vs. Portland with 




22 Aug 1720 Davis having purchased several large quantitys of SS stock applys (by 
































Ellis agrees to lend the money on having 1600L for the Loan for three Months which 
is after the rate of 40L p.c. And which 1600L was agreed to be added to the Sums lent. 
 
Accordingly Ellis pays the 16000L to the persons of whom Davis had purchased/the 
residue of the purchase money being paid by Davis/and Ellis has the stock transferred 
to himself. 
 
In order the evade the Statute of usury the form of the agreement is varied and 
Indentures of Agreement are reciprocally Executed a Copy where of is Annexed. 
 
Which agreement please to observe is for Stock as bought by Davis of Ellis for a 
future day and the 1600L for the Loan is added to the 16000L lent and Davis thereby 
Covenants to accept the Stock on the 23rd Nov 1720 and pay for the same 17,600L. 
 
Stock continuing to rise Considerably Ellis makes use of Davis's Stock and sells the 
same as we supposed at a considerable advance for it appears by the SS Books that 9 
days after viz.t 31st Aug Ellis had in his name no more than 600L but some few days 
before the expiration of the Contract he bought in Stock/it being then very 
considerably fallen/so that on the 23rd Nov 1720 he had 3500L South Sea Stock. 
 
23 Nov 1720 - The contract expired & no notice was taken by either of the partys or 
the other Ellis did not tender transfer or sell out the stock or did he require Davis's 
acceptance or payment for it Or on the other side did Davis require the Transfer or 
offer the money. 
 
(And we doubt not but Ellis has gained very considerably by trading with Davis's 
stock.)   44


































Q Can Ellis maintain an action against Davis for the 16000L lent notwithstanding this 
Deed of Agreement if so can Davis plead the Statute of Usury and thereby avoid the 
payment 
 
Paroll proofs of the Loan of the money will not be allowed to maintain an action for 
money lent against this contract of the party reduced into writing under hand and seal 
But I do not see But the borrower may plead the Statute of usury against any action 
which the lender can bring to recover the money. In case he can prove the contract or 
Loan to be or having an usurious sums for forbearance not withstanding the 
contrivance of the security to blind or avoid the statute 
 
Q Or must Ellis ground his action for breach of the Covenant by Davis for not 
accepting the stock and paying the money If so can Davis avoid the payment by the 
Statute of usury & is it not essentially necessary that Ellis proves the tender of the 
stock on the day or will a subsequent tender be sufficient 
 
I think Ellis his remedy must be on the covenant and it will be incumbent in order to 
assigne a good breach that a tender be avirrd either on the day or before with notice 
and a tender after will not be sufficient But if he could assigne a good breach I cannot 
apprehend but Davis may avoid the charge by pleading the usurious contract (this 
money lent) and (??) writing made in execution of it. In case he carefully prove it but 
it will be expected that in such a case the proofs be clear and manifest. 
 
Q Can Ellis be relieved on this Agreement in Equity should Davis insist on the statute 
of usury there 
 
I conceive that a Court of Equity will not give relief against a statute made to suppress 
usury in case the party can avoid the contract at law as usurious. 
 
Q In case Ellis shall not Register this Contract pursuant to the Late Act 7 Geo for 
restoring publick Creditt shall Davis be discharged from this demand of Ellis 
 
I conceive he will be discharged from soe much as remaynes unperformed.   45


















Q Shall Ellis be accountable for such advantages as he may have made by trading 
with this stock 
 
I do not see but he ought and may be made accountable for them In case he did by 
sale make any & he must by answer admit them or they can be proved upon him. 
 
Q Is it advisable for Davis to Exhibit a Bill in the Court of Equity in order to preserve 
the testimony of his Witnesses who are now Living and could prove the usurious 
agreement or for any purpose in order for his relief 
 
I do not think that a bill can be proper to preserve the testimony of individuals in such 
a case. But in case Ellis did really make such advantage by the sale of the stock, a bill 
will be proper to discover it( or that) but then Davis should be sure on the account of 
those advantages there will come out a balance on his side  against Ellis on demand 
on the contract which Davis will by such bill affirm as legal. 
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The Fictitious Case of John Strong and Mary Best 
 
1689....John Strong and Mary Best upon Intermarriage vested in Trustees 
20,000L to be laid out in Purchases of Land to be Settled in Strict Settlement 
with Power to Trustees to lend the Money on Government Securities till 
purchases could be had 
1691....A Purchase was made of Lands & the Consideration being 10,000L 
was laid out of Said Trust Money but the Conveyances taken to John Strong & 
his Heirs 
1720....The said Trustees lent the remaining 10,000L to said John Strong upon 
2000L South Sea Stock but no Contract or Defeazance is found between the 
said Trustees & John Strong nor was the Stock transferred to them from John 
Strong but by his Direction from other Persons of whom he had bought it at 
much greater Prices 
  The said 2000 South Sea Stock being from various Causes reduced in 
Value to 3000L Money whereby a loss was Sustained of 7000L of said Trust 
Money & the Purchases directed to be made by the Marriage Articles of 
Lands to be settled for the Benefit of the Issue of said Marriage could not be 
made and John Strong being greatly indebted by Bonds & other Specialtys did 
1721....By Deed reciting said Articles & also reciting the Loss of 7000L part 
of said Trust Money & that thereby the Issue of that Marriage would be so far 
deprived of the Benefit intended them by the said Marriage Articles the said 
John Strong at the Pressing Instances of said Trustees for & towards making 
Satisfaction for said Loss & in Discharge of so much of said Trust Money as 
the Value of Lands therein mentioned would extend settled the Lands 
purchased with the 10,000L Trust Money in 1691 & also several other Lands 
of which he was seized in Fee in such manner as the Lands to be purchased by 
the Articles were to be settled & soon after dyed leaving several Sons & 
Daughters 
N.B. The Lands of Inheritance so settled were not of Value sufficient to make 
good the loss of the 7000L Trust Money 
   47
Queare Will the Deed of Settlement made by John Strong in 1721 (for the 
Considerations aforesaid) both of the Lands purchased with the Trust Money 
& also of his own lands of Inheritance be either in Law or Equity looked upon 
as made for a valuable Consideration or will all or any of said Lands be 
Assetts by Descent in the Hands of Robert Strong the Eldest Son with Respect 
to the Creditors of his Father? 
   48
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